INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE AND RECOGNITION VIS-A-VIS GOVERNANCE OUTCOMES IN THE ELMINA CASTLE: A POLITICAL ECONOMY ENQUIRY INTO TOURISM MANAGEMENT

Ansah, J. W.

Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Cape Coast, Ghana

Abstract

This paper embarked upon a political economy enquiry into the governance outcomes of the management practices of the Elmina Castle in Ghana. Using the institutional choice and recognition analytical framework, I ask, does the involvement of the state in tourism management guarantee the satisfaction of economic needs? In-depth Interview (IDI) Schedules and focus group discussions (FGDs) were used to elicit information about the management practices from purposively selected stakeholders and indigenes in Elmina. The real meaning of institutional choice and recognition was found to have been derailed by political marginalization and exclusion culminating into half-baked governance outcomes, which find expression in unachieved community needs by state institutions and the persistence of economic inequities requiring reconfigurations in the tourism management regime.

keywords*: Governance, Institutional Choice, Recognition, Political Economy, Tourism, Elmina Castle*

Introduction

The tourism sector remains one of the fastest-growing sectors among the fastest-growing industries in the world. It is an industry that operates with enormous economic benefits at the national and community levels. Evidence of the economic performance and the economic impact of tourism are outlined in the works of Balaguer and Cantavella-Jorda (2002); Lee and Chang (2008); Zaei and Zaei (2013) with particular regard to employment and GDP growth including infrastructural development.

With regard to employment, the travel and tourism industry generated 105.4 million jobs, equalling 3.6% of the world's total employment (World Travel and Tourism Council 2015). In Africa, the travel and tourism's direct employment capacity totalled 8.7 million in 2014, which is a rise of 0.5 million over the previous year. Meanwhile adding the indirect and induced jobs generated by the industry, the figure increases to 20.5 million representing 7.1% of total employment in Africa (Africa Development Bank (AfDB), 2015). In terms of visits, Africa welcomed 65.3 million tourists in 2014, which represented 5.8% of the total international tourist arrivals which recorded

1.133 billion. This represented a 4.3% increase over the previous year (AfDB, 2015).

Worldwide tourism activity has been at its highest level. International tourism receipts rose to their highest level in 2014 at US$ 1,245 billion. Africa held US$ 43.6 billion out of these receipts, representing 3.5% of this global market share (AfDB 2015). One reason accounting for this rise is the growing influx of new visitors from emerging economies in Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, all seeking to experience the cultural heritage, extraordinary wildlife, and dramatic landscapes unique to the continent (AfDB, 2015).

Conversely, tourism, as an activity, has an equally measurable potential of harming the artificial and natural environment and create social and cultural disruptions in communities and destinations (Green & Hunter, 1992; Coccossis & Nijkamp, 1995; Stabler & Goodall, 1997; Burns 1999; Gunn & Var, 2002; Hall, 2008).

In Ghana, the benefits and the side effects of tourism are experienced in many communities as the cases are in many other developing countries (Frimpong-Bonsu,

2015). As these realities stare at developing countries and Ghana, in particular, coupled with the need to consolidate the gains made in tourism over the past few decades, the Government of Ghana has developed a number of policy planning frameworks such as the Tourism Act of 2011 (Act 817) and associated regulations (Ministry of Tourism, 2012). These policy frameworks have, ostensibly, been well outlined in the Ghana Shared Growth Development Agenda (GSGDA) of 2013 with the following objectives:

i.   Diversify and expand the tourism industry for revenue generation
ii. Promote domestic tourism to foster national cohesion as well as redistribution of income
iii. Promote sustainable and responsible tourism in such a way as to preserve historical, cultural and natural heritage
iv. Deepening on-going institutionalization and internalization of policy formulation, planning, and monitoring and evaluation at all levels (Ministry of Tourism, 2012).

As these aims are well espoused in a well thought-out policy framework, it makes sense that the extent to which tourism may be found to be either a useful or a destructive tool to national development would have to be understood within the context of the politics and the economics of administration of the tourism attraction sites. Yet, existing studies have overly concentrated on the entrepreneurial and infrastructural dimensions of tourism management (Amoakohene, 2007; Frimpong-Bonsu, 2015; Adu, 2015; Jumia Travel, 2016). A few others have delved into political issues (Holden, Sonne & Novelli, 2011) but without recourse to their economic implications, thereby creating a lacuna in the studies relative to tourism management. It is thus important to analyse the political and economic issues simultaneously by interrogating how political decisions have influenced economic outcomes and how economic conditions have generated some political outcomes. This mode of enquiry is useful given the fact that political decisions and economic choices juxtaposed with economic conditions are inseparably interconnected (Serrat, 2011).

Research Direction and Lacuna
One of the currently contested political economy issues in tourism discourse is the promotion of good governance in the industry through a framework known as *institutional choice and recognition framework*. This framework has been developed as an analytical tool for assessing the management practices in tourist attraction and natural resource sites.

Even though some analysts regard this analytical tool as a vaguely overstretched tool to analyse the management of tourist attraction sites others still regard it as the best means of analysing effective management of common resources for optimum economic and social benefits. Within this orientation and experiences about institutional choice the question that remains critical is: how are governance and institutional choice manifested in the tourism planning process in the management of the Elmina Castle of Ghana and their implications for consolidating the gains in the tourism sector for socio-economic development in the communities where tourist attraction sites are located?

Why the Elmina Castle? Despite its rich history, issues about the Elmina Castle and threats of closure of the facility by the chief of the town made news headlines since January 2017 (adomonline, 2017) hence making it a suitable study setting for issues to be placed under intellectual inquiry. This question will be addressed by answering the following specific questions.

i.   What are some of the teething issues which span out as state institutions seek to integrate the principle of 'recognition' in the tourism planning process in the tourist attraction sites?
ii. How does 'equity' play out in the tourism planning process in the tourist attraction sites?
iii. What has been the implications of the current state of recognition for the effectiveness of heritage site management?

This case study is found useful since it would create the existing knowledge production regime, which will serve as appropriate platform for policy formulation as Ghana seeks to position itself as a hub for ecotourism and cultural tourism (Oxford Business Group, 2017).

Tourism Terrain in Ghana
An apparently undisputable position that many tourism experts hold is that sustainable tourism is the key to unlocking the wealth of Ghana (Amoakohene, 2007; Adu, 2015). Ghana's tourism sector, just like many

other countries and their tourism sectors is made up of three key industries namely the hospitality industry, the ecotourism industry and the heritage tourism industry. Table 1 provides information on a variety of ecotourism sites that the country abounds in.

Table 1: Ecotourism Sites in Ghana

Parks & Resource Reserve	Sanctuaries	Ramsar Site	Botanical Gardens	Falls	Crocodile Ponds
Kakum Natioanl Park & Assin Attadanso Resource Reserve	Boabeng – Fiema Monkey Sanctuary	Keta Lagoon Complex Ramsar Site	Aburi Botanical Gardens	Tagbo Falls	Paga Crocodile Pond
Nini Suhien National Park & Ankasa Resource Reserve,	Tafi Atome Monkey Santuary		Legon Botanical Gardens	Wli Falls	
Mole National Park,	Owabi Wildlife Sanctuary				
Gbele Resource Reserve,	Agumatsa Wildlife Sanctuary,				
Shai Hills Resource Reserve	Bomfobiri Wildlife Sanctuary				
Bia National Park & Resource Reserve/Biosphere Reserve	Wechiau Hippo Sanctuary				
Kyabobo National Park,	Xafi Bird Watching Santuary,				
Bui National Park,	Agumatsa Wildlife Sanctuary,				
Digya National Park					

Source: Touringghana, 2016.

The heritage sites include the National Museum, Museum of Science & Technology, Accra, Volta Regional Musuem, Ho, Cape Coast Castle Museum, Upper East Regional Museum, Elmina Castle Museum, Museum of Nzema Culture & History, Ussher Fort Museum, Accra (Ghana Museums and Monuments Board, 2000).

In 2013, records gathered from World Travel and Toursim Council (WTTC) with regard to arrivals at some popular sites in Ghana showed that the Kakum National Park was the most visited tourist site with 184,000 visitors. This was followed by Cape Coast/Elmina Castles with 157,000. The rest include Kwame Nkrumah Memorial Park (93,000), Kumasi Zoo (68,000), Wli Waterfalls (63,000), and Manhyia Palace Museum (51,000) in that order. These figures notwithstanding, Ghana is yet to find a place in the top five most visited countries in Africa occupied by Morocco (12.8 million), South Africa (8.6 million), Tunisia (5.72 million), Egypt (5.26 million) and Zimbabwe (2 million) (United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), 2019).

A look at the variety of the tourist attraction sites and the attraction they have received has produced remarkable outcomes. As Amoakohene (2007) contests, tourism is significant for Ghana's development because it has a

competitive leverage over agriculture, industry and mining. To further buttress this assertion, Table 2 sheds more light on the contribution of tourism to the local economy.

From Table 2, all the indicators of tourism's contribution to economic growth experienced improvements between 2008 and 2015.

Table 2: Contributions of Tourism to Economic Growth
Sources: National Tourism Development Plan 2013; World Tourism and Travel
Authority 2014, 2015, Jumia Travel 2016).

Based on current records, the WTTC forecasts that the sector will grow by an annual average

Economic Item/Year	2008 GH¢ Million	2013 GH¢ Million	2014 GH¢ Million	2015 GH¢ Million
Contribution to GDP (Direct, Indi	1,982 2.8%	2,372 6.7%	7,769 n.a	10,800 7.8%
Employment	124,000	319,000	354,000	716,500
International visitors	n.a	993,600	1,093,000	n.a
Travel and Tour Investment	n.a	303. 2	674.5	1,008.4
Revenue from International Visitors	970	1,068. 6	2,292.2	3,699.5

of 4.5% between 2014 and 2024 as investment will be expected to grow by 3% a year to 2024. Ghana's anticipated performance was found to be slightly higher than the global tourism arrivals which increased by 4.4% in 2015 which stood at 1,184 million (UNWTO, 2016)

In spite of these strides, the tourism industry is bedevilled with a number of challenges. Frimpong-Bonsu (2015) observes that Ghana lacks adequate infrastructure and tourism support services at most of its tourism sites. This is especially acute in rural areas where most of the attractions are located. Inadequate transportation; poor road networks to tourist sites; poor accommodation, inadequate restaurants and rest stops, and lack of ATM facilities were identified as major challenges. In addition, limited understanding of tourism, inadequate investment and lack of professionalism equally work to impede tourism development in Ghana (Jumia Travel, 2016).

At the local level, the potential of tourism to enhance livelihoods and reduce poverty has been hindered by those conditions which impede entrepreneurship development and employment within the sector. Indeed, there is a combination of political and economic conditions which worsen tourism's inability to improve living conditions in communities. They include the lack of access to credit, exclusion from decision-making, poor entrepreneurial skills and excessive bureaucracy (Holden, Sonne & Novelli, 2011). A situational analysis of these strides and challenges in the tourism sector requires a proper understanding of the concept of governance, which serves a conceptual frame of reference for discussion of issues relative to tourism management at the local level.

Sociologists, political scientists and geographers have written enormously about choice and recognition providing original thoughts about their processes, scope and importance. These contributions have gradually been used for the development of an analytical framework known as "Institutional Choice and Recognition" which served as a useful framework in this discussion of the data herein.

Analytical Framework: Institutional Choice and Recognition

Recognition, according to Taylor (1994), happens when marginalized cultures and identity groups are given the privilege to be promoted, protected and empowered to enable them develop a positive image of themselves. It may also take the form of central political institution[1] and international organizations choosing local authorities by transferring powers to them, conducting joint activities and soliciting their input (Ribot, 2006). Recognition also takes place through the transfer of powers, collaborating in projects, engagement through contracts, participation in dialogue and decision-making (Ribot, Chhatre & Lankina, 2008).

However, the recognition of an institution goes beyond the mere acknowledgement of its authority to also consist of the creation and consolidation of authority, which becomes a political act, having deep implications for democracy (Markell, 2000; Ribot et al., 2008). The recognition of the type of institutions to implement projects is based on a conglomeration of actions and choices based on the various interests and institutions in the different arenas (Jusrut, 2015).

Recognition can be immensely useful for building local democracy. Recognition of representative authorities can provide for representation of diverse interests. Recognition of non-representative authorities subjects the individuals to the cultural and ideological vagaries of the authorities (Ribot et al., 2008). It strengthens the chosen authorities and organizations with resources and backing as well as reinforces the forms of belonging these local institutions create.

Jusrut (2015) defines four characteristics sought by 'higher-level institutions' during their process of choosing and recognizing local partners. Those four elements are: 1) efficiency, 2) integrity, 3) democracy/participation, and 4) reliability. In her abstraction, each of these characteristics connect factors emerging both from the ideological realm and from the practical realm, and they are often enmeshed. She reckons, for example, that the integrity element contributes to efficiency by limiting leakages through corruption. In addition, the democracy element is contained in democratic decentralization, which offers the possibility of harnessing the participation of local populations making the internalization of costs and benefits more effective (Jusrut, 2015).

As Jusrut (2015) further suggested the activation of the initiative to induce policy reform through institutional recognition begins with 'institutional choice'. Beyond this is the inseparable character of the two variables where the choice of local authorities itself is regarded by Ribot et al. (2008) as a form of recognition. This term refers to the choice of the locus of authorities by a 'central political institution'. This, according to Jusrut (2015) takes place in two dimensions. The first dimension is that the chosen institution fits the ideology of the higher-level institutions and the second dimension has to do with the factors related to the delivery of the project through the chosen and recognized institutions.

The institutions selected are usually the elected local authorities, indigenous or customary political authorities, civil society groups or village committees (Bandiaky, 2008) and private actors. As cited in Burns (2004), institutional choices of local groups and local political heads are predicated on the assumption that experts from central political institutions cannot be relied upon automatically to know what is good for locals, nor can they provide the locals with unambiguous truths. Rather "they should be called upon to justify their conclusions and policies in the face of public scrutiny" (Burns 2004, 29). Moreover, choosing different forms of local authorities imply different development and equity outcomes (Ribot et al., 2008).

Generally, the 'institutional choice and recognition' framework (Taylor 1994; Ribot 2006) is a useful analytical and conceptual tool for analysing the prospects for consolidation of local democracy in the context of decentralization reforms. This framework has been used by scholars to analyse various aspects of social organization around which local democracy is being articulated.

In the literature, the critiques of institutional choice and recognition are found. These critiques shed light on the functioning and dysfunctioning effects of the

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[1] This term has been used interchangeably with other terms such as 'government' (Osborne and Gaebler 1993; Ribot, Chhatre, and Lankina 2008) 'higher-level institution' (see Jusrut (2015) and state (see Mayntz 2001; Peters, 2003; Duran 2013).

complimentary roles and cooperative relationship between state and non-state actors by Hall (2009); Sisk (2001); Peters (2003); Ackerman (2004); Hara (2008); Jusrut (2015).

Hall's (2009) empirical research has found that governance more often takes the form of joining industry than of helping to design and put in practice broad mechanisms for public participation limiting socially oriented intervention and contribution to the planning and management of these destinations. The overemphasis on the form leads Ackerman (2004) to conclude that the governance approach fails to take cognisance of the fact that 'the opening up of the core activities of the state to societal participation is one of the most effective ways to improve accountability and governance' whether latently or anticipated.

Peters (2003), cited in Ribot et al. (2008) considers that governance continues to be a goal for societies assuming that the solutions that have been achieved for problems of government, especially democratic government, have also created new problems. In his submission, governance based on a system of networks and other forms of decentralization raises a problem of accountability, since it is not very clear the extent to which social actors tend to take decisions in their own name and up to what point they can assume responsibility for both decisions and their results. He notes in this regard that the formal institutions of the state are better designed to ensure accountability than non-state structures and procedures, indicating that the role of the state is therefore not to govern directly but to use its powers to legitimize the actions of other actors.

Sisk (2001) posits that participation is 'intrinsic to the core meaning of democracy' yet it seems sometimes governments view it as important only where it 'reduces government costs and responsibilities when governments can shed off service delivery to NGOs and community groups or persuade local residents to donate volunteer labour or materials'.

Jusrut (2015) argues that although the new multi-institution configuration presents potential for democratic resource management, the ensuing division of tasks among the various chosen institutions created new opportunities for collusion among elites who captured positions in the chosen institutions. Such a capture involved a small number of favourably placed villagers intercepting a disproportionately large amount of benefits from forest resources and excluding the poor majority of the population.

In sum, governance may be bedevilled with a lack of clearly defined scope of operations among the actors and the apparent lack of clarity of the actors' intentions and relationships creating accountability challenges. In other instances, putting state and non-state actors together may become a goal in itself and may create elitism reproducing inequalities rather than being a means to satisfying societal needs and bridging inequality gaps not forgetting the fact that it may be driven by a narrow-motivated economic quest to reduce cost.

Despite these critiques on the original thoughts, the reviews on those thoughts have rendered the framework very formidable and, as it stands, it remains the most valuable conceptual building block and scientific analytical tool for investigating issues related to local democracy. Subsequent to its formulation, some scholars employed institutional choice to analyse decentralization policy processes involving the use of natural resources (Toni 2007; Xiaoyi 2007; Ito 2007; Lankina 2008; Bandiaky 2008; Hara 2008; Jusrut, 2015). Other scholars have equally employed the framework to analyse political identities and inequities among cultural groups (Fraser 2000; Markell 2000; Tully 2000; Povinelli 2002; Fraser Dahl, Stoltz, and Willig, 2004). Beyond these, the dynamics of institutional choice could be equally meaningful to the understanding and analysis of tourism management practices because the management involves actors and decision making which requires some degree of recognition. This paper will then discuss the relevance of institutional choice and recognition to tourism management, using the Elmina Castle as a case study.

Relevance of Institutional Choice and Recognition to Tourism Management: Evidence from Literature

Situating tourism in the institutional choice and recognition framework, Anthony Giddens a sociologist, suggests new political systems and processes, which can deal with the social complexities of current times and the future. He introduces the challenge of integrating ecological problems into social democratic politics and argues that the notion of sustainable development fits well with the broader one

of ecological modernization which Dryzek (2013:174) defined as "the partnership in which governments, businesses, moderate environmentalists, and scientists cooperate in a restructuring of the capitalist political economy along more environmentally defensible lines"

The context within which any of these sides of tourism are contained is the sustainability of the tourism planning process, which, in ideal terms, should be characterized by governance. By inference, governance as noted by Alipour, Vaziri, and Ligay (2011), is a practical approach toward an institutional movement for sustainable tourism planning. They also find governance as a practice that effectively directs the tourism sectors at the different levels of government through forms of coordination, collaboration and/or cooperation that are efficient, transparent and subject to accountability. Further, the recognition of interdependencies and shared responsibilities are beneficial as they are directed towards the collective interest shared by networks of actors involved in the tourism sector (Alipour, Vaziri, & Ligay, 2011).

Institutional choice and recognition are useful to tourism governance due to tourism's uneven concentration within the national territory and that a better understanding of this activity at the territorial level will promote a more efficient design of national policies, especially with respect to domestic tourism. Further, the population inhabiting tourist destinations – about whom it should be said that for decades in most countries emphasis has been placed on the need to involve them in the management of their territories, because of their role as key actors (Murphy 1988; Chirenje, Galiba, & Musamba 2013). Indeed studies show that the non-involvement of the local people usually generates conflict (Mutandwa & Gadzirayi 2007; Balint & Mashinya 2008; Chirenje, Galiba, & Musamba, 2013). In applying institutional choice and recognition to tourism, this paper uses the framework to provide an analytical and descriptive model of institutional processes and governance outcomes in the realm of tourism as well as providing a conceptual tool for analysing a democratic tourism planning process. How then has institutional choice spanned out in the Elmina Castle? This is done by interrogating the management patterns in terms of actor engagement and

revenue as well as the mode of revenue distribution and the implications thereof.

Methodology
The research was mainly exploratory, it took into consideration the fact that there was no known enquiry into the political economy nuances of tourism management in the Ghanaian context. It was exploratory also because this was a study which had to rely on experiences and encounters as well as decision making and other interactive processes which had to be expressed in depth, clarity and opened in so far as they were associated with the management of the Elmina Castle. The research design thus rendered the study methods purely qualitative. In this regard, the study used in-depth interview (IDI) schedules to solicit information from the top management officials of key state institutions whose activities and functions were found to be directly and indirectly related to tourism management. They included the Assistant Director of Museums of the Ghana Museums and Monuments Board (GMMB), the Deputy Chief Executive Officer of the Central Regional Office of the Ghana Tourism Authority, the Head of Department of Physical Planning of the Komenda Edna Eguafo Abirem Municipal Assembly, the Integrated Tourism Development Officer of the Central Region Development Commission (CEDECOM) and the Programmes Officer of the Ghana Heritage and Conservation Trust (GHCT).

These top management officials who served as key informants were selected using the *'expert'* purposive sampling technique. This technique was found suitable given the fact that the selected top management officials from the institutions were well-placed as articulate informants who provided critical information which advanced the research interest and potentially opened new doors with regard to tourism management and economic implications (Palys, 2012; Given, 2008). The key informants' positions as top management officials equipped them with the requisite information about government decisions, community reactions, and modes of participation relative to tourism management and management of the Elmina Castle. In addition, the members of the traditional council of Elmina, and community groups especially the fisher-folks tour operators, the youth, and

community residents served as the focus group discussants, using the 'criterion' purposive sampling in view of the fact that they were at the receiving end of the tourism management regime at the Elmina Castle. The (FGDs) method was used to reveal underlying experiences, challenges and explored reactions to the issues relative to the management of the Elmina Castle (Wallace and Sheldon, 2015). Prior to the data collection, a pilot study was carried out at the Cape Coast Castle in February 2017. The pilot study improved the substance of the interview guide by introducing questions on income generation and distribution. The pilot study also provided insights about the other state institutions including CEDECOM and GMMB who were found to be playing important roles in tourism management.

In all, 39 research participants were selected. The summary and a breakdown of the research participants, the method of data collection and the number of participants involved is presented on Table 3

Table 3: Summary of Research Methods and Breakdown of Number of Research Participants

Research Participants/Top Management Officer	Method of Data Collection	Number of Participants
Ghana Museums and Monuments Board (GMMB) (Assistant Director of Museums)	In-depth Interview	1
Central Region Development Commission (CEDECOM) (Integrated Tourism Development Officer)	In-depth Interview	1
Ghana Tourism Authority (Deputy Regional Chief Executive Officer)	In-depth Interview	1
Komenda Ednia Eguafo Abirem Municipal Assembly (Head, Department of Physical Planning)	In-depth Interview	1
Ghana Heritage Conservation Trust (Programmes Officer)	In-depth Interview	1
Members of the Elmina Traditional Council	Focus Group Discussion	6
Community Groups Youth	Focus Group Discussion	8
Tour Guides		8
Gender Groups Men	Focus Group Discussion	6
Women		6
Total		**39**

Source: Author's Construction, 2019

The data collection lasted nine months. It started in October 2017 and ended June 2018. Official letters were personally delivered to the various institutions targeted for data collection including Ghana Museums and Monuments Board (GMMB), the Ghana Tourism Authority, the Komenda Edna Eguafo Abirem Municipal Assembly, the Central Region Development Commission (CEDECOM) and the Elmina Traditional Council. This was to enable the researcher gain access to the institutions, the Elmina Chief's Palace and the community. The leaders of the various groups were contacted to mobilize their members for the FGDs. Interviews dates were discussed, negotiated and scheduled by the researcher and the officials assigned for the interview. The interviews were carried out in the English language

each of which lasted an average of an hour and thirty minutes. However, the FGDs were organized using the local language (fante) with the motive of enhancing open and clear expressions of responses by the discussants.

All the pieces of information gathered through IDIs and FGDs were recorded using tape recorders whilst notes on relevant issues about tourism management were also taken. The experiences and expertise of the research participants were sought for and conveyed as complex knowledge based on the recounted practices, processes and actor-relationship systems as well as the historical encounters connected to the management of the Elmina Castle. In addition, indirect promptings ran through the process of eliciting answers in a manner that ensured they were more honest and informative.

Content of the interviews and focus group discussions were produced as translations and transcriptions. The data was managed manually. To enhance the veracity of the findings, direct quotations from the voices of the participants were used (Mauthner & Doucet, 2003). Relevant portions which could be used as evidence for arguments on the critical issues were highlighted and quoted verbatim. Through the selection of these portions, themes were developed to aid the structural formatting and presentation of the data obtained. Themes including management of the tourism sites, stakeholder engagement, generation of income from the tourist sites, management of the income from the sites as well as patterns of distributing tourism revenues were developed. Invariably, the themes were not prearranged; they were generated based on the feature content of the data obtained.

As part of the analysis, the study used narrative analytic strategy in terms of which the data were presented and explained within the current social, political and economic contexts. The study employed abductive reasoning by finding the most credible course between apparently unconnected political and economic phenomena in tourism management (Svennevig, 1997). In addition, the study relied on inductive reasoning. This was done by seeking possibilities based on assumptions of repeatable human actions and decisions associated with the patterns of tourism management between the state institutions and community actors (Svennevig, 1997).

Results and Analysis
Management of the Tourism Sites: Institutions Involved
The management of the tourist attraction sites in the Central Region carried out by the Ghana Monuments and Museums Board (GMMB) is mandated by law to preserve, collect and conserve Ghana's moveable and immoveable cultural heritage and transmit same for the purposes of education, entertainment and for the future generation. The moveable ones are the artefacts contained in the museums while the immovable cultural heritage includes the historic buildings. GMMB has two departments which include the museums and the monuments responsible for preserving movable cultural heritage and the immovable ones, respectively. From the late 1980s to early 1990s, an NGO known as the Ghana Heritage Conservation Trust (GHCT) became involved in the management of the tourism sites. The involvement of the GHCT was motivated by the need to effectively conserve heritage, maintain ecological balance and protect wildlife following a research carried out by USAID in Cape Coast, Elmina, Kakum and Jakpo which exposed managerial and financial deficiencies in the management of heritage and ecotourism sites.

The rationale for the inclusion of GHCT in the management of the Elmina Castle reflects Brown's (1994) assertion that institutions mandated to primarily manage tourism but do not serve tourists are limited in several important ways such as lack of capital investment in facilities that meet public needs and stimulate tourism. The inclusion of GHCT in the management of the heritage and ecotourism sites was thus to fill the managerial and financial gap through a Memorandum of Understanding signed with the Government of Ghana with the aim of forging closer collaboration in preserving and sustaining the country's historical sites, cultural heritage and forestry.

The core mandate of GHCT has been to invest funds into the operations of these sites and improve their financial viability thereof. Invariably, the role of the GHCT is to seek viable investment opportunities for the GMMB. Such entities cannot access the principal

money generated from the tourist sites. Rather they can access interest accrued from the investment of the income generated from the tourist sites. In return, the tourist sites only received aids and grants on condition that their income had been properly invested.

In return GHCT was allowed to use a percentage of the income generated from patronage to maintain and sustain the sites. By this arrangement, all revenue made from the site visits were first paid to the finance office for records and book keeping purposes and then managed by GHCT.

Stakeholder Engagement: Issues Emerging

Data gathered suggest that the key state institution – which is GMMB - does not work in isolation thus introducing some configurations of institutional choice in tourism management. The GMMB works in collaboration with Ghana Tourism Authority, the Municipal Assemblies, traditional councils, communities especially the fisher-folks, the law enforcement agencies, tour operators, hoteliers, and the Central Region Development Commission (CEDECOM). The real collaboration between and GMMB and CEDECOM was enumerated by a CEDECOM official who mentioned that the institution acts like consultants to the Ghana Tourism Authority. CEDECOM provides GMMB with statistics with regard to the arrivals within the sector and also make recommendations on, among others, the decision of citing tourism recreational centres such as rest stops. A typical example raised was the one on the way from Accra and other facilities in Agona-Swedru, albeit CEDECOM's non-direct involvement in the management of tourism sites in the region.

Using Duran's frame of governance (2013), there are indications from the responses that some fluid intergovernmental relations or effective and crosscutting systems of collaboration and transfers of knowledge among the different spheres in the tourism management sphere are present. Mayntz's (2001) conceptualization of governance could also be found apparent because state institutions such as the GMMB and non-state institutions such as GCHT and private actors within the community – which are - the fishermen and the *Asafo* groups were participating and often cooperating in the formulation and application of public policies. However, the scope of engagement is also questioned because the groups met are not exhaustive of all groups in the Elmina township. The fault was found out as the GMMB official intimated that they do collaborate with only the fishermen and the *Asafo* groups leaving out other equally important youth and women groups in the community. Clearly, there was another exhibition of the poor appreciation of governance because not all groups within a society were organized to make and implement decisions on matters that affect their lives. Indeed, the meetings with the fishermen were even carried out indirectly by meeting the Chief fisherman alone. Besides, the meetings were irregular and reactionary because the GMMB, as the official mentioned,

> *"only meets them [Chief fisherman and Asafo groups] when we have serious issues, maybe about sanitation, or any other business, we invite them over and see how best we can resolve them. There is one of their leaders who is in charge of this community".*

From the responses, it is clear that civil society (individuals and groups) and the systems, procedures and processes are deemed to be in place for planning, management and decision-making (Abdulai & Quantson, 2009). However, the groups within the Elmina community are not organized to make and implement decisions on matters related to tourism that affect their lives and are rendered unable to make the institutions more responsive and accountable.

The experiences by the traditional council of Elmina introduce some deficiencies within the remit of institutional choice. The council rarely gains the opportunity to collaborate with any institution involved in the management of the tourist attraction site. The traditional council does not have any say in the management. Besides, the traditional council is not part of the board. The GMMB appoints the managers of the castle and employs their workers. He maintained that the council only offers suggestions and advice to any organisation that is connected to a decision that has been taken. The traditional council

is only recognized when there is need for some customary rites to be performed which happen rarely, and to serve on the advisory board of the Elmina Castle.

> "For the management, we don't come in much. What we have is the Ghana Heritage Board and with that one traditional council serves on the board. I am the one who even attends those meetings....The board is such that we don't manage the affairs of the heritage sites. We only make suggestions to the main board in Accra"

The responses clearly suggest that the traditional council has not gained adequate recognition in the tourism management regime of the Elmina Castle. The nature of engagement of the traditional council is based on Ribot's (2006) construct of recognition which takes the form of central political institution (GMMB) and international organizations (GHCT) choosing local authorities and soliciting their input. However, the idea of transferring powers to the traditional council and conducting activities with the council is absent due to the lack of collaboration between the traditional council and GMMB. Invariably, the traditional council operates as an unsolicited advisor to the management of tourist attraction sites. The syndrome of non-involvement of the traditional council by the GMMB is apparently against the wish of the former.

> "Naturally, we would have wished we were part of management of the place but from the word go, when the management of the place was started, the traditional authorities were not involved."

The lack of collaboration is symptomatic of a lack of appreciation of the symbolic, economic, political and cultural value of the recognition of the traditional council in the management of the tourist attraction site. This is clearly elucidated in the words of an official at the Elmina Castle captured as follows:

> "As at now I don't think anyone [the managers of the castle] is worried about it".

On issues connected to knowledge sharing and collaboration, there is an exhibition of dominance and superiority, which results in power struggle between the actors. A case in point was the construction of the Elmina Bridge which was to facilitate the movement of tourists to and from the Elmina Castle. The GMMB official mentions that:

> "When we [GMMB] were doing the bridge, when you look at the design, they wanted to get to the ecological site. Some of them were vetoing but I stamped my feet and said no.... you will not go there. So, they had to redesign the whole project, it was not that they were even going to go inside the ecological center, in front of the Castle and a roundabout there before you turn so the original design is not what it is now".

In this regard, there is a clear deviation from the essence of recognition which, as suggested by Ribot et al. (2008), is expected to occur through partnering in projects and participation in dialogue and decision making. Beyond these, there are clear glimpses of poor collaboration between GMMB and the assembly because when the GMMB official was asked about the patterns of collaboration between the GMMB and the KEEA, he said,

> "we do not have that, but we are trying to harmonize our efforts, but it has been like this for now, they are doing their own thing and we are also doing our own thing, but we keep an eye on whatever they do".

Besides these negative nuances expressed in lack of collaboration between state actors, the observed

harmonious relationship seem to be hampered by political discontinuities. Political discontinuities happen when new governments fail to maintain structures and actors in institutions operating in previous governments. The GMMB official describes such discontinuities in the following words.

> *"Yeah, new ones will come and it is like you have to start all over and the assembly too, when they are changing, it is not only the heads who are changed but the planners and all that, they clear all of them. Some of the knowledge that you have accumulated at least they are not able to impart before they go and then, the new executives come and then they do not even know what to do".*

These observations also smack of a lack of governance, albeit not all aspects, in the tourism management regime at the Elmina Castle because actors and institutions are unable to collectively solve problems and meet their collective needs.

The concomitant effect of such deviations from governance and exhibitions of inadequate recognition is a display of power struggles between actors whose political activities and scope of operation lie in the territorial jurisdictions of the tourist attraction site (the local authority – that is – the Komenda Edina Equafo Abirem (KEEA) Municipal Assembly and those who have been legally mandated to manage the Elmina Castle (GMMB). An evidence of the power struggle is portrayed in the response from this GMMB official.

> *"So it was a real power struggle, so we had to write letters and all that and it was a bit painful, urban roads they had to re-do and they delayed the project, so we had to stamp our authority and say we have also been authorized by government to protect the place, because Elmina does not have factories, there is nothing here, the tourist sites are the only place that people come to see, and that is their goldmine, if you destroy it Elmina is finished. There is nothing here, so putting up a bridge, that is not what people will eat, so that bridge actually brought some struggle, so they had to redesign the entire project so that was a bit of a struggle with the assembly, but we stopped the assembly".*

Equity in the Distribution of Tourist Site Income
Tourism is an industrial activity that exerts a series of impacts that are similar to most other industrial activities. In this regard, the economic importance of tourism in national economy can be appreciated with reference to its contribution in infrastructure development in communities which hosts the tourist attraction sites, some of which are marginalized. This requires the application of the principle of equity, where the state and other stakeholders introduce democratic decentralization in tourism management. This process of democratic decentralization offers the possibility of harnessing the participation of local populations making the internalization of costs and benefits more effective (Jusrut 2015). Logically then, the equity principle could be seen as embedded in the institutional choice and recognition framework. This point was buttressed by a response from an official of CEDECOM who intimated that Elmina, as a community, is supposed to benefit from tourism revenue; a certain percentage that should go to the community, either in cash or in the form of a project. This position is usually justified on the altar of ownership. This according to the official is supposed to be catered for by the Ghana Museums and Monuments Board, but does this play out in the community?. Based on this the question is asked, what quantum of income is generated, how is the income managed and what are the patterns of income distribution?

Generation of income from the tourist sites
Data collected shows that the form of generating income at the Elmina Castle, is through site seeing at the facility Further, the castle is visited frequently by

people with varied socio-demographic backgrounds and the charges for natives are different form charges for foreigners. In addition, the charges also vary according to age as the charges for foreign adults differ from foreign children, as it pertains to a Ghanaian adult and a Ghanaian child. Among Ghanaian children there are variations based on one's level of education. The charges are:

Table 4: Charges at the Elmina Castle

Foreign Adults	GH 40
Foreign Children	GH 5
Ghanaian Adults	GH 5
1st Cycle students	GH 1
2nd Cycle students	GH 2
Tertiary with ID Card	GH 3

Source: Field Data (2017)

The management of the tourist sites were asked about the monthly and annual income generated from the tourist sites. The officials were not willing to disclose the details of incomes generated from the sites stating that it was confidential and not meant for public scrutiny.

Further available data also revealed that Cape Coast and Elmina Castles together generated monthly revenue between GH₵60,000 to GH₵150,000 depending on the month and season with high visits especially during the holiday season notably from June to August where most tourists arrive in the country. The income generated from Kakum National Park do not confirm the findings of Ghana Museums and Monument Board and Ghana Wildlife Conservation (2014) that the annual income generated in 2014 was GH₵3,000,000 with a growth rate of more than 50% over ten years. In linking that finding to that of this study, it means that tourism proceeds fell significantly over two years since field data suggested an annual income of GH₵1,080,000 which defies the growth rate of over 50% predicted by Ghana Museums and Monument Board and Ghana Wildlife Conservation (2014). The implication is however different for the castle as income has grown from GH₵ 1.8 million in 2014 as stated by the Ghana Museums and Monument Board and Ghana Wildlife Conservation (2014) to GH₵ 2.98 million in 2016.

Management of income from the sites

The total income received from the heritage tourism sites is managed by the Ghana Museums and Monuments Board. From the data, it implies that there is no major income used by the tourist sites themselves since all the money generated is invested and only interest on the money is accessible. Since investment interest is a small proportion of the principal, it therefore suggests reasons why the roads and infrastructure to and on major tourist sites in Ghana are bad. It can be said that because there is little money accruing to the stock of the management of these sites, maintenance of the sites have been a major challenge. The official at GMMB indicated that the tourism revenue is used for the maintenance of the facility. He intimated further that

> *In fact, government has given 100% retention; the money does not go into government accounts. We are supposed to retain it. However, it is sent to Accra then we upon request apply for it. The money goes and comes back, upon request.*

This pattern of financial administration of tourism revenue represents a convoluted form of deconcentration. Even though requests for funds from the centralized authority are made on both regular (monthly) and on occasional bases, when GMMB applies for funds some difficulties are encountered with accessing the funds. As the GMMB official indicated,

> *"some will come but others you have to push, push, push before you get it"*

This, by implication, suggests that the Ghana Museums and Monuments Board at the regional levels cannot access significant amounts of money for developmental and maintenance projects.

Patterns of Tourism Revenue Distribution

It was revealed in the study that for years, the pattern of revenue distribution has been such that 30% of all generated income was dedicated to the development of the local communities by which the traditional council manage 15% and the local assembly (i.e. the KEEA Municipal Assembly) also manage the remaining 15%. This response was corroborated by the official from the Chief's palace of Elmina.

"for a very long time when they take any money the chief wasn't getting anything but in 2006 when NPP government came, then President Kufour came over as a special guest for the Bakatue festival. When he came, the paramount chief put it before him that the castle is located on their land and we have taken care of it for some time. If even it's not our money that we use to maintain it, we have taken care of it till this point. So, if the world heritage has taken over and today they have made it a heritage site and people come to view it. If they come too they don't come empty handed, they pay something and if they don't give chiefs or the community anything then it is not fair. From then the government decided that they will give some small money".

However, this directive has been stopped as intimated by the official from the Chief's palace of Elmina.

"but when the NDC government came in 2009, they scrapped that arrangement"

The reason given suggests that there was no legal basis and policy framework for the disbursement of the money. As it stands, the GMMB official intimated and acknowledged the stoppage of the distribution of revenue from the Elmina Castle as a problem on which GMMB is actually holding discussions with the Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Creative Arts (MoTCCA). "It is an issue that we are looking at".

Many attempts have been made by the traditional authority to see the restoration of the community's share of the tourism proceeds but these have proved futile. As held by the official of the Chief's palace of Elmina,

"The traditional council during the Atta-Mills government (2009), a personal request was made by the paramount chief and other prominent citizens of the town and they said they will restore the part of whatever they collect to the traditional council but that has never taken place".

The consequence of the skewed patterns of revenue distribution is that some developmental activities have been stalled. As the official at the Elmina Chief's palace said

We opened an educational fund with the money that was brought; when the money came, it was deposited into the education fund. Out of that some students benefited. It was used to pay the fees of so many people.

In essence, the means through which the local economy of the tourist attraction sites benefits from tourism have been watered down into a narrow scope where community members benefit only through the patronage of hotels, the purchase of handicrafts and the allocation of shops close to the castle where they sell their wares, when enquired form the GMMB official. This confirms Frimpong-Bonsu's (2015) finding that Ghana lacks adequate infrastructure and tourism support services at most of its tourism sites such as inadequate and poor transportation network, social services and recreational facilities.

This skewed pattern of revenue distribution smacks of economic inequities in a manner which favours the state at the expense of the community hosting the Castle. Thus it has become evident that the emphasis on the use of tourism for macroeconomic expansion is not translated into ways that benefit the poor (Holden, et al., 2011). In this regard the second tourism policy framework objective of promoting

domestic tourism to foster national cohesion and redistribution of income is grossly undermined. This confirms the findings of Mowforth and Munt (2003) that tourism can increase inequality in the local community because its economic benefits go to outside operators, elites and government. From the governance perspective, as espoused by Alipour, Vaziri, & Ligay (2011), the realities surrounding the distribution of tourism receipts are enough to prove that the existing patterns of governance in the management regime of the Elmina Castle are not enough to make it an instrument used to solve problems and to meet society's needs of the people of Elmina. This is largely connected to the fact that governance patterns have been devoid of political inclusion of the traditional leaders and other relevant groups in the community on decisions about how the tourism receipts should be distributed. The character of governance at the Elmina Castle is also devoid of quick political responses to community needs by the state institutions which are directly and indirectly involved in tourism management and tourism wealth distribution. The community and its members are then disadvantaged despite the existence of a tourist attraction site.

The concomitant effect of the lack of equity is a subtle form of conflict which has erupted between the community members and the state authorities. One respondent from the community recounts:

> *"The community members complain because they think where the edifice is situated belongs to them so they should benefit from it".*

The complaints by the local community corroborate findings by Mutandwa and Gadzirayi (2007) as well as Balint and Mashinya (2008), which preceded the introduction of the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe. These studies suggested several forms of conflict between the local communities and the tourist management authority of Zimbabwe because of economic inequities. It is critical to note that even though the local communities in this study are not currently engaged in any act of violence to impede

the development of tourism in their locality, the currently unequal patterns of tourism receipts could inform a prediction that the exhibitions of complaints may degenerate into violent forms of conflict between the local community and management body of the tourism site. This may even transcend to the government on the effective development of tourism in the local communities.

> *"for example I think Elmina, at times some people would encroach and those who do not see the importance of the place, we have to pass through their leaders to educate them. So, at times it has not been easy and then you have to meet and talk about these things".*

These observations aptly support the assertions of Eagles (2002), that the ineffective management of tourism by not giving back to the communities causes negative impact on protected area resources and the community because it provides an unsuitable alternative mechanism of resource mobilisation and utilization by the community members which may bring adverse impact on environmental resources. As most often observed, rural communities cut down trees, hunt and farm in these forest reserves out of necessity for survival and this leads to deforestation and endangering of the species used in the tourist and thus a further deterioration of the ecotourist sites. For the heritage tourism, the community will start using some facilities around the tourist sites or work even around it which destroys the beauty of tourism. Thus, it is explicable why some fishermen mend their nets in front of the Elmina Castles. These incidents are replicas of some events in Zimbabwe as reported by Mutandwa and Gadzirayi (2007) as well as Balint and Mashinya (2008) and in Tanzania by Chirenje, Galiba, and Musamba (2013) where conflicts ensued between community members of tourist attraction sites because the activities of the managers of the site jeopardized the community members' quest to use the environment and natural resources as means of survival. This finding, however, contradicts findings of Zaei and Zaei (2013) which found that tourism

necessities help in creation of infrastructure, utilities and amenities for local population.

Conclusion

From the data gathered, it is apparent that the tourism management terrain at the Elmina Castle has experienced some features of governance and some other recognizable displays of institutional choice but with inadequate forms of recognition. The data also suggests that the quality of governance has been undermined by lack of strong collaboration and knowledge transfer, power struggles and a convoluted form of decentralization. This has been coupled with excessive centralization of tourism income management practices. It is equally noticeable that the notion of equity remains illusory as the community is kept out of the tourism receipts distribution matrix. In addition, the tourism industry at the Elmina Traditional Area has been battered by political exclusions, political discontinuities and political inertia with economic inequities and socio-economic deprivations. All the cases of political exclusion are clear representations of the absence of recognition in the management of the Elmina Castle. The character of governance has also been devoid of quick political response to community needs by state institutions which are directly and indirectly involved in tourism management and tourism wealth distribution. The implications of the apparent political and economic marginalization of the community, traditional leaders and interest groups are dire. First is the difficulty of building local democracy because knowledge sharing and wealth distribution are apparently uneven. It would also mean that the representation of diverse interests will not be achieved. It has therefore weakened the chosen authorities and organizations with resources and backing as well as undermining the forms of belonging these local institutions create. The tourism management regime at the Elmina Castle lacks the finesse to build local democracy. On this score the deprived community members could engage in acts of subtle violence that may destabilize existing patterns of wealth generation in the tourism sector. Summing up all issues raised in the paper, it is obvious that tourism management practices relative to the Elmina Castle have lacked the total essence of governance. Invariably, the real meaning of

institutional choice and recognition has been derailed by political and economic marginalization. In this sense, the political economy enquiry into tourism management at the Elmina Castle shows an interplay of the political and economic exigencies in the tourism sector in which one can observe the coexistence of political exclusion and economic inequities in a manner where the political exclusion contributes to economic inequities.

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